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Abstract
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Abstract 
Meri t-based pay provides teachers with monetary bonuses for reaching identified 
student achievement goals. Performance-based pay provides other types of bonuses to 
teachers for reaching similar student achievements. This paper will discuss both the 
positive and negative outcomes for providing these incentives to teachers. School 
districts in several states have implemented various aspects of merit and performance-
based pay with vary ing resu lts. 
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Merit-based pay is defined as the practice of rewarding teachers with monetary 
bonuses for the accomplishment of target goals andlor basing a percentage of the 
teachers' salary on student achievement. A meri t-based pay program can be 
implemented in numerous capacities varying in percentages of salary and size of the 
bonus. Perfonnance-based pay is defined as accepting a lower base pay in return for the 
opportunity to earn bonuses predicated upon predetermined goals. In contrast to the 
merit-pay system, performance-based compensation models seek to promote corporat ion 
and partnership among teachers. Rather than comparing teachers' perfonnance against 
each other, teachers are evaluated against a set of criteria detennined by the school or 
school district. 
The purpose of a merit and performance-based pay system is to enhance student 
achievement by rewarding teachers for the accomplishment ofpresct goals or 
benchmarks. Merit or performance-based pay can be subdivided into three general 
categories: individual, grade level teams and school districts. Individual incentives 
reward a single teacher for their performance, grade level teams promote cooperation and 
the participants equally share the rewards or bonuses, and rewarding entire school 
districts recognizes and reinforces the fraternal, interdependent learning culture. 
For the purpose of this paper, the terms merit-based pay and performance-based 
pay will be interchangeable. 
Positive 
Perfonnance-based pay can be viewed as an irmovative compensation strategy 
that has the potential to increase student learning through the use of effective teaching 
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practices. Odden and Carolyn (2000) make the argument that performance-based pay 
will detemline the overall quality of the teaching professionals. "When coupled with 
other initiatives - e.g. , signing bonuses, greater overall pay, improved working 
conditions, - higher beginning salaries are even more powerfuL Education will not be 
able to recruit its share of qual ity individuals unless it pays competiti ve beginning 
wages." Positive attributes of a merit-based pay program include school districts ability 
to " . . . attract and retain more highly skilled teachers, and be a more efficient use of the 
educational dollar." Mi lanowski (2006). In his paper for the Wisconsin Center for 
Education Research, Milanowski (2006) elaborates that financial resources need to be 
used to retain high performers and districts with less impressive facilities, and the ability 
to match competitive salaries could strengthen district abili ty to retain effective teachers. 
Effective teachers are identified and rewarded. Teachers who are less successful can seek 
effective teaching practices from colleges, rai sing the overall standard of quality. 
Teachers who are unable to attain the new standard could be pushed out of the profession. 
"Besleyand Machin (2006) found that the existence of a performance premium 
assoc iated with being a good head teacher resulted in poor head teachers leaving thei r 
jobs rather than accepting lower salaries." 
In their article in the Peabody Journal of Education, Podgursky and Springer 
(2007) cite a study by Lazear that concludes "A performance pay system will tend to 
attract and retain individuals who are particularly good at being incentivized and repel 
those who are not." In addition to attracting and retaining effective teachers, 
performance based pay creates a climate that encourages profess ional development. 
"Vaughn (school district) has anecdotal evidence that its pay program is attracting high-
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quality younger teachers because of its pay-for-performance orientation and teachers ' 
ability to earn a higher sa lary faster" (Odden & Kelly, 2000). 
"The introduction of performance related pay can also motivate employees to 
pursue professional deve lopment opportunities that previously offered little in the way of 
additional benefits for the individual. Productivity is therefore likely to improve both in 
the short run, because employees are working harder, and also in the longer run, as staff 
professional deve lopment generates further gains in productivity" (Prentice, 2007). 
Speaking about a case study outside the rea lm of education, Lazear states ". 
although the incentive system raised the productivity of the typical worker employed, it 
also tends to raise the overall qual ity of the workforce" (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). A 
similar opinion is expressed by Lawler (2006) in a speech to The Albert Shanker 
Institute. "You attract to some degree, to the degree that you are at or above market. 
You loose people if you are below market." Lawler continues "If you give everybody an 
increase, the poorer perfonners often get above the market and are retained because they 
essentially have no options that equal what they are making where they are." 
Negative 
The problem of insulat ing teachers' performance from their compensation is 
compounded as teachers accumulate seniority enhancing the incent ive to remain in the 
profession. Podgursky and Springer (2007) state " ... studies of teacher turnover 
consistently find that high-abi li ty teachers are more likely to leave teaching than teachers 
of lower-abi li ty." In response to this startling information, it is reasonable to assume that 
high~ability teachers were lured away from education. This is not the case, according to 
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" ... a recent provocative study by Hoxby and Leigh (2004) which found evidence that the 
migration of high-ability women out of teaching from 1960 to the present was primarily 
the result of the "push" of teacher pay compression - which took away relatively higher 
earnings opportunities for teachers- as opposed to the pull of greater nonteaching 
opportunities" (podgursky & Springer, 2007). The coll ision of degrading forces resulting 
from the traditional seniority pay scale have obscured standards of accountability and 
have created a compounding incentive for low performing teachers to stay in education. 
There are unintended negative outcomes which become potential concerns in 
regards to individual teachers and the cumulative effects on the learning culture within 
schools. " ... teachers rated other outcomes quite low in desirability. These undesirable 
outcomes included public criticism for not meeting goals, loss of professional pride for 
not meeting goals, risk to job security, intervention, putting in more hours, less freedom 
to teach things unrelated to goals, and more pressure and job stress (Kelley, Odden, 
Milanowski, & Henenman III , 2000). The negative feelings become especially 
troublesome if they eclipse positive or enthusiastic sentiments. "Putting in more hours 
and more pressure and stress were seen as more likely than any of the positive outcomes" 
(Kelley el aI. , 2000). 
A significant obstacle in the merit-pay debate is teachers' attitude of acceptance. 
" ... teachers may regard the pay increases they receive near the end of their careers as a 
recompense for relatively low initial salaries: being "underpaid" early in their career is 
offset by higher pay later" (Milanowski, 2006). In his examination of students preparing 
to be teachers Milanowski (2006) was repeatedly confronted with a positive outlook 
concerning merit-based pay. He proposes "It may be that new teachers - those who have 
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not yet experienced the subjecti vity of evaluation and the instabili ty of programs and 
funding, and who have not become accustomed to the traditional pay schedule - might be 
more accepting of performance-based pay." It would appear that the optimism of 
perspective teachers far exceeds that of the teachers who have experienced a 
performance-based pay plan. "Just the issue of merit pay, which Milton mentioned, 
produced a book about six years ago that found 3,000 research studies evaluating the 
impact of meri t pay systems in work organizations. And I can report that the results were 
overwhelming negative. The systems were not shown to have positive impacts, on 
balance, in virtually any setting" (Lawler, 2006). 
Measurement 
If the foundation of teacher compensation is to be based on the meri ts of the 
teacher, a primary consideration is how do you quantify merit? Multiple avenues of 
quantification have been proposed, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. 
The most popular assessment measures of teacher performance include: students' scores 
on state tests, principal observation and evaluations, an independent evaluation agency, 
teacher content knowledge assessments, master teacher observation and evaluations, and 
benchmarks and target goals. 
In his critique of rewards systems, Lawler (2006) stresses the importance of 
" ... objective, creditable measures - and here's the key point - inclusive of the major 
behaviors that you want someone to demonstrate. Many reward systems end up being 
dysfunctional because they pick an obvious easy-to-measure behavior. .. " 
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The process for evaluating teachers through observation is often criticized as being too 
subjective. State tests are viewed as a limited expression of a teachers' contribution in the 
classroom, and test scores are considered vulnerable to uncontrollable variables not 
related to education, such as illness, family conflicts, inadequate sleep, and countless 
olhers. " It was difficult to create a reliable process for identifying effective teachers, 
measuring the value-added to a student by an individual teacher, eliminating 
unprofessional preferential treatment from the evaluation processes, and standard izing 
assessment systems in schools" (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). A valid assessment 
system must comprehensively encompass teaching standards that produce student 
achievement. 
" ... a recent careful review by researchers at Rand concluded that studies 
"provide evidence that teachers have discernable, differential effects on student 
achievement, and that these effects appear to persist into the future," the size of these 
effects are difficult to determine, and many claims of big impacts on student achievement 
are exaggerated (Haskins & Loeb, 2007). 
Milanowski (2004) based his assessment system on seventeen performance 
standards grouped into four domains. "Teachers were evaluated in six classroom 
observations and a portfolio prepared by the teacher. Four of the evaluations were 
conducted by a teacher evaluator, and two were conducted by principals and assistant 
principals. Conclusions from the study of more than 3000 teachers from more than 
seventy inter-city schools in Cincinnati indicated" " ... teacher evaluation scores had a 
moderate degree of criterion-related validity." Another conclusion of the Mi lanowski 
(2004) study stated" ... teacher evaluation scores may be useful as representations of 
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teaching practices that affect student learning." One disclaimer of the Milanowski (2004) 
study that has a profound impact on the interpretation of data stresses" ... it is important 
to recognize that very high correlations between teacher evaluation scores and student 
achievement measures are unlikely to be found for reasons including error in measuring 
teacher perfonnance, error in measuring student perfornlance, lack of alignment between 
the curriculum taught by teachers and the student tests, and the role of student motivation 
and related characteristics in producing learning." If effective teacher practices can not 
be conclusively linked to student achievement due to unreliable measurements of teacher 
and student performance, then how is it possible to determine merit or base a 
compensation model on the same error prone measurements. It is imperative that 
teachers have fu ll confidence that the value of their input can be reliably measured and 
quantified. 
"Often called value-added modeling, the general idea of the method is to use 
complex statistical techniques and repeated testing of students to measure changes 
in students to measure changes in student performance ... But problems arise in 
using student test scores to identify effective teachers. The use of test scores 
gives teachers an incentive to manipulate the system by teaching test-taking skills, 
focusing more on some students than others, undennining the perfonnance of 
other teachers, or simply cheating" (Haskins & Loeb, 2007). 
The reliability of standards based instruction is further complicated by a claim 
from Ramirez (2001) in his article "How Merit-Pay Undennines Education". He states 
"In theory, a first-year chemistry teacher fresh out of college is not as effective with high 
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school students as is a lO-year veteran with a master's degree in science .. critics counter 
that empirical evidence doesn't support such logic. They assert that a teacher's training 
is irrelevant and that experience counts for nothing." Ramirez (200 1) goes on to question 
"Unless all inputs are equalized for all teachers and administrators, how can policy 
makers judge the vaJue of the outcome?" Podgurskyand Springer (2007) also conclude 
there is a lack of continuity between estimated teacher effects and measured teacher 
characteristics. Lawler (2006) speaks to the unreliability of accurately quantifying a 
teacher's individual role related to student achievement. " ... "objective" metrics often 
lead to strange results that lead so many organizations to come back to a judgment of the 
individual made by a supervisor rather than a metric that is based on a test." The idea 
that a subjective assessment trumps an objective quantification in relation to student 
learning is highlighted by Podgursky and Springer (2007). "A number of value-added 
studies find that principal evaluations are a reliable guide to identifying high- and low-
performing teachers as measured by student achievement gains." A study conducted by 
Sanders and Hom reinforces the reliability of principal evaluations. "There is a very 
strong correlation between teacher effects as determined by data and subject ive 
evaluations by supervisors" (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). 
One of the first large-scale studies, published by Wi lliam Sanders and 
June Rivers of the University of Tennessee in 1996, was based on test 
score results in mathematics for students who were fo llowed from grades 
three through five . Teachers for each grade were divided into five groups 
of equal size based on the improvement they produced in their students' 
math scores. Students who had teachers in the top fifth of teacher 
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effectiveness for each of the three years scored about 50 percentile points 
better than students who had teachers in the lowest fifth. Subsequent 
analyses showed that teachers in the top fifth produced improvement 
among all students, regardless of their original scores or ethnic group. 
Teacher quality is the single most important feature of the schools that 
drives student achievement." (Haskins & Loeb, 2007). 
Concern about the integrity and independence of subjective evaluations must be 
considered. In a summative report examining the perspective of head teachers in England 
and Wales the" ... possibility of unreliable decisions where the personal relationship 
between team leader and teacher is either very good or dislocated by previous 
tensions ... " (Haynes, Wragg, Wragg, & Chamberlin, 2003). Lawler (2006) raises 
questions about the so called objective assessment of tests. " ... most of the pay-for-
performance systems highlight test scores, not teacher instruction, and test scores are 
much more subject to corruption than instructional practices." 
A clear system that accurately measures effective teaching practices has yet to 
emerge in the debate of merit-based pay. A schism also exists in the effort to establish a 
cause and effect relationship between effective teacher practices and student 
achievement. Teacher evaluations should be extensive to increase the validity of an 
accurate assessment. Given the lack of reliability from a myopic view of assessment, 
multiple avenues of assessment need to be employed with consideration to short-term and 
long-tenn growth. 
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" .. . research fails to establish any relationship between graduate degrees and 
student learning un less the degree is in the field in which the teacher specializes, and 
even here the evidence is quite weak. Similarly, there is no correlation between student 
learning and workshops, institutes, and study groups for teachers. Hill recommends that 
professional development be reformed to comply with three guideposts: courses or 
workshops should be at least several days duration; they should focus on subject-matter 
instruction; and they should have goals and curriculum materials used by the school 
system in which the teacher works" (Haskins & Loeb, 2007). 
South Carolina School Incentive Reward Program (SIRP) is the longest running 
state-sponsored, group-based performance plan in the nation. The typical winning school 
receives between $1 5,000 and $20,000 (Kelly & Odden, 1995). A school gain index 
(SGI) is calculated for each school. Awards are based on three criteria, student 
achievement, teacher attendance, and student attendance. Oflhese three criteria, student 
achievement gain is the most important measure. Overall , schools have shown 
improvement in student performance on standard ized exams. However, student and 
teacher attendance have not seen marked improvement. Schools in the lowest socio-
economic status bands have seen the greatest improvements in student achievement. 
Utilizing the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) as the 
measuring stick for students' improvement and teachers' productivity allows for a more 
"level playing fie ld" for teachers who have low-achieving students . Tennessee Value-
Added Assessment System focuses on students; improvement, and allows teachers that 
help previously underperforming students make signi ficant learning gains during the year 
to receive credit for their accomplishments (Holland & Soifer, 2004). Rewards for high 
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TVAAS scores include a $5,000 bonus for individual teachers and the potential of a 
$2,000 bonus for every teacher in the school if the school receives a high overall TVAAS 
score. In addition to salary bonuses, other incentives provided to teachers by the CEA 
include loans toward the purchase of a house in a neighborhood near a low-performing 
school, free legal services, and frec tuition toward a master's degree in urban education 
(Holland & Soifer, 2006). These incentives have helped reduce teacher recruitment and 
retention problems and improve student achievement at the nine schools utilizing this 
program (Plucker et. AI, 2005). 
The following tables show the mean desirability responses and response 
distribution and the results for other measures of pay increase system preference. 
(Milanowski , 2006). 
Performance Pay System Preferences of Students Preparing to Be Teachers Table I 
Mean Desirability Responses and Response Distribution 
Pay increase based on: Mean (std. -4 or -3 -2 or -I 0 neutral +lor+2 +30r +4 
dev.) highly 
undesirable 
Individual performance 1.7(2.1) 5% 
Developing knowledge and 1.8 3% 
ski lls ( 1.8) 
School performance OJ 14% 
(2.3) 
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Performance Pay System Preferences of Students Preparing to Be Teachers Table 2 
Results for Other Measures of Pay Increase System Preference 
Pay system Rat ing of 
Pay for individua l performance 
Pay fo r knowledge and skill 
development 
Pay for group performance 
Pay not based on performance 
Motivation 
attract iveness vs . pay 
not based on 
perfo rmance 











A key premise of the merit based pay system is the idea that teac hers can be 
motivated by the opportunity to maximize their earning potenti al. Specific goals or 
teacher practices can be highlighted or emphasized with the benefit of increased focus 
creating a clear " line of sight" (Lawler, 2006) of desired objectives. Quest ions 
concerning the motivational potent ial of capital as it relates to teachers are an essenti al 
j anus po int. The answer to the quest ion, "Are teachers motivated by money?" can be 
either a launch pad for the debate of merit-based payor an impact barrier that terminates 
the d iscussion. 
In a report summarizing the outcomes of schoo l based performance awards from 
schools in Maryland, Kentucky, and North Carolina, researchers concluded " rece iving a 
bonus was rated qui te high in desirabil ity, as were outcomes pertaining to recognition, 
satisfaction in meeting goals, seeing students learn and improve performance, and 
working with other teachers" (Kelley et ai, 2000). Lawler (2006) fortifies the argument, 







relatively small amount of money may be quite meaningful to people because it confirms 
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something about themselves; it carries a sense of status and a sense of recogni tion." " It is 
much more likely that 9 or I 0 percent or even 15 to 20 percent of pay needs to be at ri sk 
in order for it to be important enough for most people to get excited about and change 
their behavior" (Lawler, 2006). Other estimates that speak to the entire workforce are 
slightly more conservative. " Research in the private sector has found that in order to 
affect a worker's motivation, annual bonuses need to be at least 5 to 8 percent of salary -
about $2,000 for a typical teacher" (Odden & Kelley, 2000). 
Teachers seemj usl as likely to be motivated by money as the next worker, but 
money alone can not maximize mot ivational potential. The synergetic interaction of 
monetary rewards and public recognition seem to be a packaged necessity in the 
institution of a successful performance-based program. The Heneman report cautioned 
against other relati ve and extraneous culminating factors that potentially impact their 
conclusions. " .. . the relationship between teacher motivation and school achievement we 
were likely to find might be weakened by many factors, including unreliability in the 
motivation and achievement measures and the impact of many factors other than teacher 
motivat ion on achievement" (Kelley et a!., 2000). 
Conciusion 
The goal ofa performance-based pay program is to increase effective teaching 
practices to elevate student achievement. The infusion of motivation into the profession 
of teaching is encouraging and exciting, but the unknown, unintended consequences of a 
merit-pay program need to be considered. The biggest obstacle performance-based pay 
faces is the subjectivity of assessments and observat ions and the validity of state and 
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teacher produced tests to measure student achievement. Quantifying acceptable and 
reliable data is a major road block on the path to merit pay. If an acceptable, re liable 
measurement of effective teacher practices and student achievement could be agreed 
upon, merit-pay could help improve student learning. Areas that need to be addressed are 
measurement and motivation, specifically targeting the quantification of student output as 
it relates to teacher input. 
Merit and Performance-Based Pay 17 
References 
Haskins, R., & Loeb, S. (2007) . A plan to improve the quality of Teaching in 
American schools. The Future of Children, 17(1), 1-7. 
Haynes, G., Wragg, T. , Wragg, c., & Chamberlin, R. (2003). Performance management 
for teachers: Headteachers' perspectives. School Leadership and Management , 
23( 1),75-89. 
Heneman III , H., Milanowski, A., & Kimball , S. (2007). Teacher performance pay: 
Synthesis of plans, research, and gu idelines for practice. CPRE Policy Briefs (RB-
46). 
Holt, M. (200 1). Performance pay for teachers: The standards movement 's last stand? Phi 
Del/a Kappan, 312-317. 
Kelley, C., Heneman III , H., & Milanowski, A. (2000). School-based performance award 
programs, teacher motivation, and school performance. CPRE Research Report 
Series (RR-44). 
Kelley, C., Odden, A., Milanowski, A., & Henenman Ill , H. (2000). The motivational 
effects of school-based performance awards. Policy Briefs: Reporting on Issues in 
Education Reform (RB-29). 
Lavy, V. (2007). Using performance based pay to improve the quality of teachers . Fuiure 
Of Children Journal, 17(1), 2-30. 
Lawler, e., (2006). From best research to what works: performance-based compensation 
in public education. The Albert Shanker Institute. 
Milanowski, A. (2004). The re lationship between teacher performance evaluation scored 
Merit and Performance-Based Pay 18 
and student achievement: Evidence from Cincinnati . Peabodylournal of 
Education, 79(4), 33-53 . 
Milanowski, A. (2006). Peliormance pay system preferences of students preparing to be 
teachers (WCER Working Paper No. 2006-8). Madison: University of Wisconsin-
Madison, Wisconsin Center for Education Research. Retrieved May I, 2008 from 
http://www. weer. wisc .edu/publications/workingPapers/papers.php 
Odden, A. & Kelley, C. (2000). Addressing teacher quality and supply through 
compensarion policy. University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Plucker, J., Zapf, J., & McNabb, A. (2005) . Rewarding teachers for student's 
performance: Improving teaching through alternative teacher compensation 
programs. Education Policy Brief 3(5), 1-6. 
Podgursky, M., & Springer, M. (2007). Credentials versus performance: Review of the 
teacher performance pay research. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(4), 551-
573. 
Prentice, G. (2007) . Performance pay in the public sector: A review of the issues and 
evidence. Office of Manpower Economics, 
Ramirez, A. (200 1, February) . How meri t pay undermines education. Edllcarionai 
Leadership, 58(5), 16-20. 
